The amount of scientific findings linking air pollution with adverse health effects is continuously growing and indicates a need for action to improve air quality. On September 21, 2005, the European Commission published a new draft directive on air quality, as part of the Thematic Strategy on air pollution. This is a long term plan on how to reduce air pollution in the European Union in the next 15 years. Immediately after its release, the Commission received criticism for not going far enough from various instances, such as research institutions and NGOs concerned with health and environmental effects of air pollution. One policy argument for not taking full measures was the argument of scientific uncertainty. In light of this air quality strategy and the corresponding criticism which ensued, the present article discusses how the ambiguity of scientific uncertainty may contribute to impeding the process of translating scientific findings into concrete policy options. As complete certainty is likely to never be achieved, the question arises whether it is possible to determine and agree on clear and applicable definitions of certain levels of scientific certainty. The case referred to in this paper clearly demonstrates a situation with discordant views on the uncertainty of scientific findings. More discussion on how to define scientific uncertainty and how to deal with it would be beneficial for both the scientific and the political communities. Finally, it is important to recognise that scientific evidence is not the only driver influencing policy decisions.
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Background
On September 21, 2005, the European Commission published a new draft directive (European Commission, 2005 ) on air quality, as part of the Thematic Strategy on air pollution. This is a long term plan on how to reduce air pollution in the European Union (EU) in the next 15 years. According to the Commission's analysis 370 thousand premature deaths in Europe in 2000 were related to exposure to particulate matter (PM) and ozone. By implementing the Commission's plans this number is expected to be reduced to 230 thousand by the year 2020.
Immediately after its release the Commission received criticism for not going far enough from various instances, such as research institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) concerned with health and environmental effects of air pollution. More specifically, in a letter signed by 37 air pollution and health scientists across Europe, the suggested cap value of PM 2.5 (fine particulate matter) is accused of being far too high to adequately protect human health (IRAS, 2005) . Further criticism was expressed as: "'uncertainty' is being used as an argument to support this high value whereas research, in no small measure paid for by the Commission, has reduced uncertainty to the extent that an evidence based pollution reduction policy can now be strongly supported" (IRAS, 2005) . Another point of criticism has been the current lack of legally binding of the strategy's exposure reduction plans.
From the content of the directive it is obvious that the EU recognises the current levels of air pollution as a significant threat to human health and the necessity of taking actions. As a result the EU has chosen a strategy with an annual budget of 7.1 billion Euros. This strategy is predicted to reduce, but not to remove, the adverse health effects of air pollution. A great number of citizens will still be suffering from polluted air in 2020 and the corresponding costs of damage to human health alone are estimated to between 189-609 billion Euros per annum (European Commission, 2005) . This means that the health damage caused by air pollution is estimated to cost between 27-86 times more than the suggested strategy for improvement. It can therefore be questioned if not the use of more resources and stricter guidelines may be justified. In this strategy, the Commission suggests a cap value of 25 Fg/m 3 for PM 2.5 , in order to protect against high exposure levels. As an argument for choosing this particular value it is stated in the directive that it "takes account of the inherent uncertainties in our current knowledge about the risks of PM 2.5 " (European Commission, 2005) . It is this part of the directive in particular which provokes the scientists, who claim that research, with sufficient certainty, has demonstrated that such a level has been associated with significant adverse effects (IRAS, 2005) . The scientists also mention that complete certainty never will be achieved and that there are reasons to think that the estimated risks are on the low side, rather than on the high (IRAS, 2005) .
In short, the European Commission and the scientists agree about the health impact of particulate air pollution and the need for action to protect against such effects. However, there is an obvious discrepancy in what they consider as sufficiently certain scientific evidence. To demonstrate the benefits of the strategy the Commission refers to their cost-benefit analysis.
This analysis is based on input from research which is considered as too uncertain for a lower PM 2.5 cap value, but certain enough for the selection of a strategy. The cost-benefit analysis shows that significant effects of PM will remain in 2020 after having implemented the strategy. Despite this, the Commission suggests a PM 2.5 cap value regarded as "highly unprotective" by the scientists and to delay the decision of making other targets of the strategy legally binding. The selection of a strategy which is known to give limited health benefits on something which is recognised as a significant health threat, can be seen as a demonstration of science not being the only driver of environmental policies.
In light of this air quality strategy and the corresponding criticism which ensued, the present article discusses how the ambiguity of scientific uncertainty may contribute to impeding the process of translating scientific findings into concrete policy options. There are of course factors additional to scientific uncertainty which may influence a risk assessment or a cost benefit analysis which serve as key information in discussions leading to policy decisions. It is for instance important to ensure that the risk assessments are scientifically objective by giving weight to both positive and negative studies and by examining all available evidence.
Closely linked to the process of summarising and interpreting scientific evidence is the concept "weight of the evidence". This concept has recently been comprehensively reviewed (Weed, 2005) and indicates a need to reach consensus on its meaning and the use of its associated methods. The importance of reaching consensus on the concept's meaning is also applicable to scientific uncertainty.
Dealing with uncertainty and its ambiguity
Airborne particulate matter (PM)'s ability to induce both respiratory, as well as cardiovascular morbidity and mortality, is well-documented. Also toxicological evidence tends to support the epidemiological results. An important activity in research of PM effects on health has been to meet the criticism on single city/area studies -often with a single air quality monitoring station by launching large multi-centre studies using the same methodology. Despite this, it has proven difficult to define an air quality standard which adequately protects human health.
One factor contributing to this is that a threshold level, below which effects are unlikely to occur, has not been identified. No threshold level means that all exposure levels can lead to some degree of adverse health outcome. Although lower exposure levels are likely to cause less harm, the challenge still remains to then determine an acceptable risk-level. Additional factors making the development of guidelines for PM difficult are uncertainties induced by for 6 instance the wide range of techniques used for exposure assessment, variation in individuals' susceptibility and variation in composition of PM in time and by location. The latter factor implies that the health benefit of compliance with a certain PM standard might vary from negligible to considerable within and between various populations. Risks can be estimated when both an outcome and its probability of occurrence is well known. This requires knowledge about the mechanism underlying the association between the cause and the outcome. With regard to PM, no consensus on the precise mechanism behind its associations with health effects has yet been reached, despite many investigated hypotheses. Most likely several mechanisms are of importance. Based on this information on PM's potential to adversely affect human health, it can be concluded that compliance with the suggested strategy may on one hand be beneficial, have no effect, or on the other hand be harmful on an individual level.
With regard to different types of air pollutants there are wide gaps in our current knowledge and thus uncertainty with respect to their potential to affect human health. To provide an adequate level of protection and an acceptable margin of safety, uncertainty factors have been used in setting guidelines for inhalation of different air pollutants. Such uncertainty factors are designed to take into account factors influencing the data on adverse effects of pollutants on human health. The quality of the data on effects, possible interactions with other components, the type of adverse effect investigated, extrapolation of effects observed in other species to effects in humans, extrapolation from high exposure effects to low exposure effects, interindividual variations in sensitivity and from small groups selected for studies to the general population, are all examples of factors influencing the size of the uncertainty factor.
For carcinogenic air pollutants only unit risk evaluation is generally applied and no safe level can be recommended, whereas for non-carcinogenic compounds uncertainty factors have varied between almost zero (for carbon monoxide) to a 1000 (dichloroethane) (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2000) . These wide differences in uncertainty factors may be due to variations in the quality of the data and the potential of these compounds to damage human health. This demonstrates that uncertainty is dealt with in different ways. Uncertainties regarding exposure levels and adverse health effects for many air pollutants have apparently been far greater than for particles, e.g. dichloroethane, benzene, nitrogen dioxide and acid particles (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2000; Grahame and Schlesinger, 2005) .
However, the impact of low level guidelines and even more so of rigorous standards would be far greater for particles than for example dichloroethane, because exposure to the latter compound is not ubiquitous and thus an estimated health impact would much less than that for particles.
The fact of not knowing what we do not know makes it impossible to foresee every outcome of a cause or to identify all causes for an outcome. This might partly explain the commission's hesitations for a more stringent PM cap-value. Obtaining compliance with stringent air quality standards can become very costly, depending on emission levels. Expensive investments in emission reduction implicate expectations of noticeable improvement. This does not only mean improvement in terms of achieving compliance with air quality standards. A reduction in incidence and prevalence of adverse health outcomes should also be achieved. As such expectations are likely to increase with increasing use of resources, a stringent strategy may result in deep disappointment and even mistrust should it turn out to be a failure.
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The possibility for an improvement strategy to result in unforeseen adverse effects is a consequence of the persisting gaps in our knowledge. This can be adverse effects on the specific situation a strategy is aimed at, as well to other areas which initially were not expected to be influenced at all. With regard to PM emissions, it has for instance been hypothesized that filtering out larger sized particles may cause an increase in the concentration of smaller-sized particles. The idea behind this hypothesis is that small particles under normal ambient conditions are partly removed by aggregation onto larger particles.
Together with observations indicating that smaller-sized particles might be more harmful to health than larger particles, this illustrates how a measure aimed at improvement might result into the opposite, just because we do not know everything.
How should policy makers cope with this ever-existing uncertainty? In their directive the Commission seems convinced about 'inaction' not being an option, but uncertain about the effectiveness of making the exposure reduction targets legally binding and lowering the PM2.5 cap value. Based on the current scientific knowledge with its 'inherent uncertainties' the Commission has decided to take a certain amount of measures. Such an intermediate approach may reduce the impacts of unforeseen outcomes and protect against potential accusations for non-action or for having wasted resources. The decision of taking measures against a potential threat, based on scientific knowledge with 'inherent uncertainties', can be linked with the general ideas behind the so-called 'precautionary principle'; 'better to be late than sorry'. According to EU's Communication on the Precautionary Principle, this principle will be applied "where preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community" (European Commission, 2000) .
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There are various definitions of the precautionary principle. The EU builds upon Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which states that: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." (UNEP, 1992) . This definition, as other definitions of the precautionary principle, contains ambiguous terms which makes the approach interpretable in many ways, and thus applicable for most situations. What is for instance seen as a 'threat'? How severe must the threat be to meet the criteria for taking precautionary measures? Furthermore, as 'full scientific certainty' is likely to never be achieved, and as gaps in knowledge might influence what we perceive as a threat, are the criteria for reaction according to the principle exclusive? The arbitrariness and ambiguity of the precautionary principle has been criticised (Marchant and Mossman, 2004) .
To what extent EU's strategy on air quality can be seen as acting according to the precautionary principle, depends on how EU's guidelines for application of the precautionary principle are interpreted. These guidelines state for instance that: "measures based on the precautionary principle must not be disproportionate to the desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk, something which rarely exists" (European Commission, 2000).
Another guideline is: "Risk reduction measures should include less restrictive alternatives which make it possible to achieve an equivalent level of protection, such as appropriate treatment, reduction of exposure, tightening of controls, adoption of provisional limits, recommendations for populations at risk, etc" (European Commission, 2000) . The strategy's correspondence with these guidelines might partly explain why the Commission does not go as 'far' as some would have liked it to go regarding air quality. However, due to several ambiguous terms, the same guidelines may also be used to defend the criticism on the In the United States (US) the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to carry out a periodic review and revision, where appropriate, of the scientific criteria and the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants such as PM. In a review of EPA's methods to determine the carcinogenic risk associated with exposure to hazardous air pollutants by The National Academy of Sciences it was recommend to conduct formal uncertainty analysis which may be specifically useful in identifying where additional research is likely to resolve major uncertainties (NRC, 1994) .
Other recommendations with regard to uncertainty were to develop guidelines for quantifying and communicating uncertainty as it occurs into each step in the risk assessment process, and when ranking risks to consider the uncertainties in each estimate rather than ranking solely on the basis of point estimate value. Recently the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin which is a guide intended to enhance the technical quality and objectivity of risk assessments that are used by federal agencies in regulatory decision-making (OMB, 2006) . According to this bulletin influential risk assessments (in the bulletin defined as: a risk assessment the agency reasonable can determine will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or private sector decisions) are to meet certain additional standards. With regard to uncertainty influential risk assessments should characterise uncertainty with a sensitivity analysis and, where feasible, through use of a numeric distribution (OMB, 2006) . A recent workshop, "Bridging Components Along the Exposure-Dose-Response Continuum", focused on tools that can help scientists address uncertainty. The workshop highlighted the need for environmental and toxicological scientists to more fully utilise the techniques of probabilistic risk assessment for uncertainty analysis. Thus, the uncertainty issue has been developed further to facilitate the assessment of scientific results and maybe their use in policies.
Concluding remarks
This essay, written in light of an air quality strategy with corresponding criticism, demonstrates how discordant perceptions of uncertainty may offer great challenges when science is to be translated into policy. Despite more research, uncertainty will always be present. Uncertainty is thus something we will have to learn to deal with. With regard to the air quality strategy, it might be beneficial for the scientists and the decision makers to come together to clarify the discrepancy in their interpretations of scientific uncertainty and to set common goals for further research. In 1965 Sir Austin Bradford Hill made the following statement about the incompleteness of scientific knowledge: "All scientific work is incomplete -whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us as a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time" (Hill, 1965) . The precautionary principle can be seen as a response to this statement and offers a way for decision makers to deal with uncertainty. However, as with uncertainty, we are unfortunately also in this principle faced with ambiguous terms which causes confusion and discussion.
Finally, it is important to realise that uncertainty is not the only challenge in the translation of science into policy. In fact, science will have to compete with other factors as for instance the importance of economic growth, public awareness and perceptions of other risks. Undertaking policy decisions are very complex processes, eventually depending on a group's perception 13 and judgement based on both information and pressure from various instances. A decrease in scientific uncertainty will therefore not necessarily increase science's influence in policy decisions.
